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resource-rich countries since its WTO accession in December 2001. The authors’ empirical 
approach follows the logic of the differences-in-differences estimator. In addition to temporal 
variation arising from the WTO accession, which they argue was exogenous to other 
countries’ growth trajectories, the authors exploit spatial variation arising from differences in 
natural resource wealth. In this way they can compare changes in economic growth in the 
pre- and post-accession periods between countries that benefited from the surge in demand 
for industrial commodities brought about by China’s WTO accession and countries that were 
less able to do so. They find that that roughly one-tenth of the average annual post-accession 
growth in resource-rich countries was due to China’s increased appetite for commodities. 
The authors use this finding to inform the debate about what will happen to economic 
growth in resource-rich countries as China rebalances and its demand for commodities 
weakens.  
 
JEL Codes: F4, F62 
 
 
CEPS Working Documents are intended to give an indication of work being conducted 
within CEPS’ research programmes and to stimulate reactions from other experts in 
the field. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not 
necessarily represent any institution with which they are affiliated.  
 
 
ISBN 978-94-6138-356-3 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (http://www.ceps.eu) 
© CEPS 2013 Contents 
1. Introduction  ................................................................................................................................... 1 
2.  China’s WTO accession as the cause of the recent commodity boom .................................. 3 
3. Empirical  strategy  ........................................................................................................................ 4 
4. Data  ................................................................................................................................................ 6 
5. Results  ............................................................................................................................................ 7 
6. Counterfactual  scenarios  ........................................................................................................... 11 
7. Concluding  remarks  ................................................................................................................... 12 
References ............................................................................................................................................ 13 
Appendix: Tables  ................................................................................................................................ 14 
 
 
List of Figures 
Figure 1. Real commodity price indices (2005 = 100) ...................................................................... 4 
Figure 2. Total Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP, year = 2000) ................................................. 7 
 
 
List of Tables 
Table 1. Summary statistics ................................................................................................................. 7 
Table 2. Fixed effects estimation  ......................................................................................................... 8 
Table 3. Pooled OLS estimation  .......................................................................................................... 9 
Table 4. Fixed effects estimation  ....................................................................................................... 10 
Table 5. Counterfactual scenarios by region  ................................................................................... 11 
 
Table A1. Fixed effects estimation.................................................................................................... 14 
Table A2. Fixed effects estimation with sample period 1993-2007 .............................................. 15 
Table A3. Fixed effects estimation with resource dummy ........................................................... 16 
 
  
| 1 
How much did China’s WTO accession 
increase economic growth in 
resource-rich countries? 
Thomas Barnebeck Andersen, Mikkel Barslund, 
Casper Worm Hansen, Thomas Harr and 
Peter Sandholt Jensen* 
CEPS Working Document No. 384 / October 2013 
1.   Introduction 
Many countries, and in particular emerging markets, have experienced extraordinarily rapid 
economic growth during the past decade or so.1 This paper quantifies the extent to which 
natural resources have contributed to this growth. We focus on the period 2002-08, i.e. the 
period which began immediately after China entered the WTO and which ended just as the 
global financial crisis started to discharge its depressive force in earnest. We focus on this 
particular period because commodity price inflation accelerated around 2002 and then 
turned negative in 2008, but also because this period allows us to combine plausibly 
exogenous  temporal variation in commodity demand with plausibly exogenous spatial 
variation in the supply of natural resources for purposes of identification.  
More specifically, our empirical approach follows the logic of the differences-in-differences 
estimator. We exploit temporal variation arising from China’s WTO accession on 11 
December 2001 and spatial variation arising from differences in the availability of natural 
resources such as coal, oil, minerals, etc. This allows us to compare changes in economic 
growth in the post-accession period (2002-2008) relative to the pre-accession period (1992-
2001) between countries that stood to benefit from the increase in demand for industrial 
commodities brought about by China’s WTO accession and countries that did not.2  
For our full sample of 162 countries, we find that the increased demand for various raw 
materials induced by China’s WTO accession increased average annual growth by about 0.27 
percentage points. In relative terms – i.e. as a share of total growth – this translates into 
8.62%. Put differently, slightly less than one tenth of actual average annual growth between 
                                                      
* Thomas Barnebeck Andersen, Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern 
Denmark; Mikkel Barslund, Centre for European Policy Studies, Belgium; Casper Worm Hansen, 
Department of Economics, Aarhus University, Denmark; Thomas Harr, Standard Chartered Bank, 
Singapore; Peter Sandholt Jensen, Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern 
Denmark.  
The authors would like to thank Nikolaj Malchow-Møller for useful comments. This Working 
Document has also been published in the series Discussion Papers on Business and Economics, No. 
15/2013, Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark. 
1 Even Africa has joined the club of fast-growing regions. The IMF’s World Economic Outlook (October 
2012) projects Africa’s real GDP growth for 2013 to be 5.7%. 
2 To minimise measurement error in economic growth rates, we follow the lead of Henderson et al. 
(2012) and construct adjusted growth rates using earthlights observable from outer space. This 
adjustment is only possible for the period 1992-2008, which explains the length of our sample 
window. We do, however, also report results from unadjusted growth. 2 | ANDERSEN, BARSLUND, HANSEN, HARR & JENSEN 
 
2002 and 2008 was, according to our calculations, due to China’s increased demand for 
commodities. We perform similar calculations for all major regions of the world. For the sub-
Saharan African sample, for instance, we find that China’s WTO accession increased 
economic growth by 0.29 percentage points in absolute terms and 10.74% in relative terms.  
The credibility of our empirical strategy, and consequently of our results, centres on the 
assumption that we are able to control for all other changes that (i) occurred around the time 
of China’s WTO accession, and that at the same time (ii) correlate with natural resource 
availability and (iii) affect economic growth. In other words, if a potential change is thought 
to threaten our identification strategy, it must be the case that this change simultaneously 
fulfils (i)-(iii); if it fails to do so, it cannot, as a matter of logic, constitute a threat to the 
validity of our approach.  
Investigating the extent to which natural resources have contributed to economic growth is 
interesting for at least two reasons. First, it speaks to the ‘metals or management’ debate, 
which revolves around the relative importance of improved economic management versus 
the surge in international commodity prices as the key driver of growth in resource-rich 
emerging markets (Beny & Cook, 2009; Andersen & Jensen, 2013).3 Finding, as we do, a fairly 
small impact from natural resource availability is evidence against the view that strong 
economic growth in emerging markets over the last decade has been driven primarily by the 
boom in commodities.4  Second, it speaks to the ongoing debate about how commodity 
exporters will be impacted as the Chinese economy rebalances. China has begun the process 
of shifting its developmental model from one driven by exports and investment to a more 
sustainable model driven in large part by domestic consumption (Bettis, 2013). There is no 
doubt that we will see significantly slower Chinese growth as a consequence.5 This will affect 
economies around the world; it will in particular hurt exporters of raw materials such as 
Africa, Australia, and Latin America.6  Pessimists, such as Ocampo & Erten (2013), even 
argue that it will mean the end of “income convergence worldwide.” We use our empirical 
model to inform this debate. Indeed, our results suggest that commodity producers will be 
able to withstand slower Chinese growth in coming decades.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses China’s WTO accession, with the aim 
of establishing (i) that it caused a commodity boom and (ii) that it was exogenous to other 
countries’ growth trajectories. Section 3 discusses the empirical strategy in detail, while data 
                                                      
3 Conventional wisdom in the financial press appears to be that resource-rich countries have enjoyed a 
long boom thanks to China’s hunger for commodities; see e.g. Financial Times, 1 July 2013, “China’s 
long march.” 
4 This squares well with Andersen & Jensen (2013), who find that ‘economic management’ explains a 
large part of Africa’s recent growth spurt.  
5 The World Bank estimates that Chinese growth will slow to between 6% and 7% by the end of the 
decade; see Financial Times, 15 April 2011, “China enters era of slower growth.” This compares with an 
average of 10.2% over the last decade. 
6 The IMF has attributed much of this growth to China’s increasing appetite for natural resources, 
especially energy and metals. Fund researchers find that when demand in China falls, so do 
commodity exports from commodity-exporting countries. On average, 1 percentage point decline in 
Chinese demand translates into a fall in commodity exports of about 0.4%. Financial markets clearly 
see eye-to-eye with the IMF on the prominence of Chinese demand for commodity exporting 
countries. For instance, in a week when the leaders of Australia and New Zealand happened to be in 
China to sign trade deals, the former two countries’ currencies rose by 2% and 3%, respectively. The 
following week, both currencies plummeted in accord as China released figures showing that the 
economy had grown at a much slower pace than expected; see Financial Times, 24 April 2013, “Hidden 
benefits of China’s slower growth.” HOW MUCH DID CHINA’S WTO ACCESSION INCREASE ECONOMIC GROWTH IN RESOURCE-RICH COUNTRIES? | 3 
 
are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 presents our results. Section 6 addresses economic 
significance using different counterfactual scenarios, and discusses what happens when 
China slows. Concluding remarks are offered in Section 7. 
2.   China’s WTO accession as the cause of the recent commodity boom 
A commodity price boom that was unprecedented in magnitude and duration preceded the 
recent global economic crisis (Erten & Ocampo, 2012). Most commodity analysts agree that a 
critical factor behind the rise in commodity prices was the strength of Chinese demand for 
industrial commodities (Ocampo & Erten, 2013; Yu, 2011). According to the IMF’s World 
Economic Outlook (2006, Chapter 6), China contributed almost all of the increase in world 
consumption of nickel and tin during 2002–05. In the cases of lead and zinc, China’s 
contribution even exceeded net world consumption growth. For the two most widely traded 
base metals, aluminium and copper, as well as for steel, the contribution of China to world 
consumption growth was about 50%. According to the same IMF report, China’s 
contribution to world consumption growth of aluminium increased by 10 percentage points, 
copper by 8, lead by 68, nickel by 75, steel by 16, tin by 52, and zinc by 71 percentage points, 
compared to the period 1993-2002. For oil, the comparable number was 9 percentage points.7 
The important thing to notice here is that China’s consumption of industrial commodities 
picked up strongly following its entry into the WTO on 11 December 2001.  
An important steppingstone on China’s long walk towards the WTO was the trade deal 
signed by China and the US on 15 November 1999. By the time the deal was signed it was 
not certain that it would go through the US Congress.8 Moreover, 24 out of 135 member 
countries, including the EU, still had not agreed on entry terms with China at the time.9 
However, on 24 May 2000, some six months after the signing of the trade deal, the US House 
of Representatives passed the bill to give China permanent trade status with the US. And 
since the EU had reached a deal with China during the previous week, Chinese entry into 
the WTO was expected from that point on. The actual date of entry was unknown, however, 
and it was not until 17 September 2001 that the final negotiations were concluded.  
The crucial issue in connection with joining the WTO was that membership helped China 
lock in the gains from rule-based multilateral trade; at the same time, it greatly reduced 
concerns about market access (Wang, 2007).10 This gave investors and traders incentives to 
exploit the economies of scale offered by China’s deeper integration into the world economy. 
WTO entry was also a lever its reform-oriented leadership could use to complete the 
transition to a more market-oriented economy (Lardy, 2001). The WTO accession led to long-
                                                      
7 Oil efficiency is also much lower in China than in the US (Beirne et al., 2013). 
8 Under American law at the time, normal trade relations with China were conditional on an annual 
vote by Congress that was heavily influenced by human rights issues in China. Congress had to agree 
to change the law, since this annual vote was incompatible with WTO rules. See The Economist, 18 
November 1999, “The remaining hurdles.”  
9 And even if Congress and member countries endorsed the deal, China still had to deliver on its 
liberalisation promises, which again was not a foregone conclusion. There was resistance from 
hardliners and speculation that the unsettling consequences of WTO entry would spark social unrest. 
See The Economist, 18 November 1999, ”China opens up.” 
10 The WTO accession involved, among many other things, national treatment of foreign-funded firms 
and greater opportunities for exporters of services. In manufacturing, China had to abolish non-tariff 
barriers and reduce tariffs. It also meant that China had to adhere to the principle of non-
discrimination and had to liberalise investment rules. Moreover, WTO accession led to increased 
transparency and predictability of Chinese trade policy (Ianchovichina & Walmsley, 2005). 4 | ANDERSEN, BARSLUND, HANSEN, HARR & JENSEN 
 
term investments in manufacturing capacity and infrastructure, which strongly increased 
demand for metals such as copper, aluminium, and steel (Coates & Luu, 2012; Heap, 2005). 
The effect of China’s WTO accession on commodity demand is distinctly visible in prices; 
Figure 1 shows that real commodity prices picked up sharply after 2002.  
Figure 1. Real commodity price indices (2005 = 100) 
 
Source: World DataBank, Global Economic Monitor (GEM) Commodities 
(http://databank.worldbank.org).  
The critical aspect of China’s WTO accession for the purposes of the empirical analysis below 
is that it generated an increase in demand for commodities that is plausibly exogenous to the 
growth trajectory of other countries. This means that we can potentially use this variation in 
c o m m o d i t y  d e m a n d  a s  p a r t  o f  a n  i d e n t i f i c a t i on strategy. The next section outlines our 
approach in more detail.  
3.   Empirical strategy 
In order to understand our empirical approach, consider the following differences-in-
differences type specification: 
(1)                 ·      ·      ∑     ·    ·   
 
                   
In equation (1),   1 , 2  (  1  refers to the period 1992-2001 and   2  refers to 2002-08),      
is average annual growth in real GDP per capita in country  ,     measures  the  natural 
resource endowment,      is a binary indicator that takes the value 1 in the post WTO-
accession period and 0 otherwise,    is a regional indicator, and    is a country fixed effect. 
Note that by including   , we allow each region to have its own region-specific time trend; 
and note also that by including a country fixed effect,   , we pick up time-invariant as well as 
slow-moving growth influences. The parameter of interest is   , which measures the impact 
o f  n a t u r a l  r e s o u r c e  a v a i l a b i l i t y  o n  e c o n o m i c  g r o w t h  i n  t h e  p o s t  W T O - a c c e s s i o n  p e r i o d  
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relative to the pre-accession period.11  This means that we can estimate by how much the 
impact of natural resource availability on economic growth changed after China’s WTO 
accession.  
We also estimate a model with a lagged dependent variable but without the country fixed 
effect. That is, we also estimate the following specification:  
(2)            ·      ·      ∑     ·    ·   
 
         ·                 
where       is (log of) lagged real GDP per capita. A few comments are in order. First, the 
lagged dependent variable in equation (2) has a theoretical interpretation in terms of 
transitional dynamics (Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 2004). Second, as equations (1) and (2) are not 
nested, the most obvious thing to do would be to ensure nesting by adding a country fixed 
effect to equation (2). Unfortunately, the conditions for consistent estimation in this case are 
much more demanding that those required for equations (1) and (2); but, fortunately, 
equations (1) and (2) have a useful bracketing property in the sense that they bound the 
‘true’ effect (Angrist & Pischke, 2009).12  
As explained briefly in Section 1, the requirement for identification is that no other changes 
occurred around 2002 that both correlate with natural resource availability and affect 
economic growth; stated more formally, it must be the case that         ·   ,          0 .13 
This condition is more likely to be fulfilled when region-specific time trends are included, as 
in equations (1) and (2), than if we had only included a global time trend (i.e. only included 
   as opposed to    interacted with all regional indicators). The region-specific trends, for 
example, pick up regional macroeconomic policy improvements.  
It is worth stressing the advantages offered by equations (1) and (2). Consider for example 
the study by Ahuja & Nabar (2012) in which the authors ask whether a fall in China’s 
investment rate will reduce global economic growth. They construct a measure of Chinese 
influence on country i as the product of Chinese fixed investment in year t times country i’s 
export to China as a fraction of GDP. Both of these constituent variables are likely to be 
endogenous to country i’s growth trajectory. Export to China as a fraction of GDP, an 
outcome variable, is endogenous on account of both simultaneity (higher growth in country i 
is likely to diminish export/GDP) and omitted variables bias (many factors that influence 
export also influence growth). Chinese fixed investment may be endogenous because geo-
political tensions, for example, may affect both the timing of Chinese investments as well as 
individual countries’ growth trajectories via commodity prices. Such endogeneity concerns 
are likely to be eliminated in our differences-in-differences setup since we rely on plausibly 
exogenous temporal variation in export demand and use plausibly exogenous spatial 
variation in export supply.  
                                                      
11  The fixed effects estimator does not allow us to identify the impact of    , as it cannot be 
distinguished from the country fixed effect    . All we can hope for is identification of the impact 
relative to the pre-accession base period. 
12 This of course requires that either equation (1) or equation (2) is the ‘true’ population regression 
model.  
13  The transparency of our identification strategy should be compared to the usual VAR/VECM 
approaches found in the literature, which rarely discusses the assumptions behind identification (e.g. 
Arora & Vamvakidis, 2011). These approaches mechanistically apply some ad hoc decomposition of 
the innovations in order to identify the impulse responses.  6 | ANDERSEN, BARSLUND, HANSEN, HARR & JENSEN 
 
4.   Data 
It is well known that GDP data from many countries are badly measured. Indeed, for some 
regions one may reasonably doubt that GDP data make much sense (Jerven, 2013). In 
Zambia, for example, just one man was responsible for preparing national income accounts 
in 2010; at the same time, incentives were actually biased against producing estimates.14 
Moreover, data collection is politicised with measurement often “taking the backseat” 
(Jerven, 2013).  
Since results can be no better than the quality of the data that goes in to the analysis, we try 
to address these data issues by following the lead of Henderson et al. (2012) in producing 
adjusted real GDP per capita growth rates by employing satellite data on the amount of 
earthlights that can be observed from outer space at night. Consumption of nearly all goods 
in the evening requires lights. As income rises, so does light usage per person. And since 
several error-prone measures are better than one, empirical researchers can combine 
administrative real GDP data with lights at night to reduce measurement error. 
Consequently, the growth observations used below are a convex combination (weight: 0.5) of 
observed real GDP per capita growth and the fitted values from a regression of this variable 
on growth in night lights (for further details, see Henderson et al., 2012).15 The observed real 
GDP per capita measure is in local currency units and taken from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. We also report results using only unadjusted growth rates. The 
earthlight adjustment is only possible for the period 1992-2008, which explains the length of 
our dataset. 
Our measure of natural resource availability is taken from the World Development 
Indicators 2013. The data build on the methodology used in the World Bank (2007) project 
“The Changing Wealth of Nations”, which assigned dollar values to stocks of the main 
energy resources (oil, gas, and coal), ten metals and minerals (bauxite, copper, gold, iron ore, 
lead, nickel, phosphate rock, silver, tin and zinc), and timber (roundwood). We employ the 
total rent measure, which is the sum of all rents (i.e. the sum of oil, natural gas, coal, metals & 
mineral, and timber rents). Total rent is expressed as a percentage of nominal GDP.16  
The specific methodology used by the World Bank in the construction of total rent is as 
follows. Non-renewable natural resource wealth should, in theory, be calculated as the 
present discounted value of economic rents over the life time of the resource, i.e. as     
∑    ·    ·  1                
    , where    is unit rent (i.e., unit price minus unit cost),    is the 
level of production,   is the social discount rate, and   is the life time of the resource. Since 
future rents are unknown, the World Bank calculated resource wealth on the assumption of 
constant per-period total rent, i.e.    ·         ·    for all  . This means that the actual formula 
used in the calculation of rent is         ·    ·    1       1    · 1        ⁄  . In the specific 
calculations performed by the World Bank,     0.04 and   2 5 .17 In the estimations below, 
we use the calculations for the year 2000, i.e.     2000 (using     1995 instead gives similar 
results, statistically speaking, to those reported below). This gives us a measure of natural 
resource availability calculated on the basis of year 2000 prices, costs and production levels, 
i.e. prices, costs and production levels in force prior to China’s WTO accession. Figure 2 
provides a map of natural resource availability according to the total rent measure. 
                                                      
14 For many African countries, base years for GDP series even date back some 20 years. 
15 Earthlights data were downloaded from 
http://www.econ.brown.edu/faculty/henderson/lights_hsw_data.html on 27 July 2013. 
16 Total rent is denoted NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS in the World Development Indicators. 
17 If   2 5  is larger than the reserves-to-production ratio,   is set equal to the latter value. HOW MUCH DID CHINA’S WTO ACCESSION INCREASE ECONOMIC GROWTH IN RESOURCE-RICH COUNTRIES? | 7 
 
Figure 2. Total Natural Resource Rents (% of GDP, year = 2000) 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 2013. Variable defined as NY.GDP.TOTL.RT.ZS in the World 
Development Indicators 
We use the World Bank’s regional classification code to construct regional indicators. These 
are East Asia & Pacific (EAS), Europe and Central Asia (ECS), Latin America & Caribbean 
(LCN), Middle East & North Africa (MEA), North America (NAC), South Asia (SAS), sub-
Saharan Africa (SSF).  
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the variables used in the main analysis. Note that 
we have balanced the panel, as an unbalanced panel fits uncomfortably with the differences-
in-differences approach.  
Table 1. Summary statistics 
Observation  Mean  Standard deviation  Minimum   Maximum 
Year = 1 (1992-2001) 
Adjusted growth  162  0.0155  0.1550  -0.0314  0.1104 
Totnatresrent 162  0.0899  0.1784  0  1.4227 
y 162  10.287  2.2158  5.8512  16.139 
Year = 2 (2002-2008)                
Adjusted growth  162  0.0313  0.1587  -0.0407  0.0971 
Totnatresrent 162  0.0899  0.1784  0  1.4227 
y 162  10.440  2.2466  5.8309  16.604 
 
5.   Results 
Table 2 reports results from the fixed effects estimation of equation (1). Column 1 is the 
estimation for the full sample with 162 countries. The point estimate of    equals 0.0335 and 
it is significant at the 5% level. The simple fixed effect specification explains more than 44% 
of the variation in economic growth. In the remaining columns 2-8, we exclude geographical 
regions one-by-one in order to check robustness of the estimate in column 1. With the 8 | ANDERSEN, BARSLUND, HANSEN, HARR & JENSEN 
 
exception of column 3, where the 40 countries belonging to Europe & Central Asia (ECS) are 
excluded, point estimates are always significant at 5%. In column 3, the point estimate drops 
by about one third and precision also drops a bit. Overall, the estimate in column 1 appears 
fairly robust. In the table, point estimates are bounded by the interval [0.0213–0.0502]. 
Table 2. Fixed effects estimation 
Estimating equation:                ·      ·      ∑     ·    ·   
 
                   
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Adjusted  growth 
                          
Constant 0.0155***  0.0151***  0.0162*** 0.0150*** 0.0158*** 0.0155*** 0.0151*** 0.0161*** 
  (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
2.year#totnatresrent 0.0335**  0.0352**  0.0213 0.0316**  0.0381***  0.0335** 0.0336** 0.0502** 
(0.0135) (0.0142) (0.0152) (0.0143) (0.0146) (0.0135) (0.0135) (0.0201) 
2.year#EAS 0.0053  0.0061*  0.0054 0.0050 0.0053 0.0053 0.0041 
(0.0034)  (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0035) 
2.year#ECS 0.0237***  0.0236***  0.0238*** 0.0234*** 0.0237*** 0.0237*** 0.0228*** 
(0.0039) (0.0039)  (0.0039) (0.0038) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0037) 
2.year#LCN 0.0129***  0.0128*** 0.0135***  0.0127*** 0.0129*** 0.0129*** 0.0121*** 
(0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022)  (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022) 
2.year#MEA 0.0085*  0.0082  0.0108**  0.0089*  0.0085* 0.0085* 0.0054 
(0.0049) (0.0050) (0.0049) (0.0049)  (0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0061) 
2.year#NAC 0.0057***  0.0057*** 0.0057*** 0.0057*** 0.0057*** 0.0057***  0.0057*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) 
2.year#SAS 0.0110***  0.0109*** 0.0117*** 0.0111*** 0.0108*** 0.0110***  0.0102*** 
(0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0031)  (0.0034) 
2.year#SSF 0.0086**  0.0084**  0.0102*** 0.0088**  0.0080** 0.0086** 0.0086** 
(0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0036) 
Observations  324 280 244 260 292 322 312 234 
R-squared  0.447 0.462 0.361 0.424 0.450 0.447 0.444 0.538 
Number  of  countries  162 140 122 130 146 161 156 117 
Excluded region  None  EAS  ECS  LCN  MEA  NAC  SAS  SSF 
Notes: Asterisks *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. All standard errors (in 
parenthesis) are clustered at the country level. Regional code is: East Asia & Pacific (EAS), Europe and Central 
Asia (ECS), Latin America & Caribbean (LCN), Middle East & North Africa (MEA), North America (NAC), South 
Asia (SAS), sub-Saharan Africa (SSF).  
In Table 3 we report results from a pooled OLS estimation of equation (2). The point estimate 
of    in the full sample of 162 countries equals 0.0267 and is significant at 1%, cf. column 1. In 
the table, point estimates are always bounded by the interval [0.0255–0.0313]. Moreover, 
with the exception of column 8 where the 45 countries belonging to sub-Saharan Africa (SSF) 
are excluded, point estimates are always significant at 5%.  
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Table 3. Pooled OLS estimation 
Estimating equation:                ·      ·      ∑     ·    ·   
 
         ·                 
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Adjusted  growth 
                          
Constant 0.0115**  0.0168*** 0.0131*** 0.0100*  0.0096* 0.0114**  0.0110**  0.0084** 
  (0.0045) (0.0053) (0.0048) (0.0056) (0.0050) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0042) 
2.year#totnatresrent 0.0267*** 0.0300*** 0.0206**  0.0258*** 0.0313*** 0.0267*** 0.0266*** 0.0255 
(0.0083) (0.0075) (0.0090) (0.0088) (0.0086) (0.0082) (0.0083) (0.0167) 
2.year#EAS 0.0082** 0.0081**  0.0088*** 0.0074**  0.0082**  0.0086*** 0.0073** 
(0.0032)  (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0030) 
2.year#ECS 0.0221***  0.0222*** 0.0228***  0.0216***  0.0221*** 0.0225*** 0.0215*** 
(0.0028) (0.0029)  (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) 
2.year#LCN 0.0156***  0.0157*** 0.0152***  0.0151*** 0.0156*** 0.0160*** 0.0150*** 
(0.0021) (0.0022) (0.0022)  (0.0022) (0.0021) (0.0021) (0.0022) 
2.year#MEA 0.0071*  0.0070  0.0077* 0.0079*  0.0072* 0.0075* 0.0067 
(0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0043)  (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0050) 
2.year#NAC 0.0102***  0.0111*** 0.0096*** 0.0107*** 0.0097*** 0.0105***  0.0091*** 
(0.0014) (0.0016) (0.0016) (0.0017) (0.0015)  (0.0014) (0.0013) 
2.year#SAS 0.0207***  0.0209*** 0.0204*** 0.0213*** 0.0201*** 0.0207***  0.0200*** 
(0.0031) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0032) (0.0031) (0.0031)  (0.0031) 
2.year#SSF 0.0077**  0.0081**  0.0080**  0.0084*** 0.0067**  0.0077** 0.0081*** 
(0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0030) 
y 0.0004  -0.0002  0.0003  0.0005 0.0006 0.0004 0.0004 0.0008* 
  (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
Observations  324 280 244 260 292 322 312 234 
R-squared  0.284 0.304 0.205 0.270 0.292 0.284 0.282 0.355 
Number  of  countries  162 140 122 130 146 161 156 117 
Excluded region  None  EAS  ECS  LCN  MEA  NAC  SAS  SSF 
Notes: Asterisks *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. All standard errors (in 
parenthesis) are clustered at the country level. Regional code is: East Asia & Pacific (EAS), Europe and Central 
Asia (ECS), Latin America & Caribbean (LCN), Middle East & North Africa (MEA), North America (NAC), South 
Asia (SAS), sub-Saharan Africa (SSF). 
According to the Angrist-Pischke result discussed in Section 3, the full sample estimates in 
Tables 2 and 3 (i.e. the estimates found in the first column of both tables) brackets the ‘true’ 
value of   . That is, the interval [0.0267–0.0335] pins down the value of   . For completeness, 
and despite the bias induced by the correlation between the fixed effect and lagged 
dependent variable, we also estimate the fixed effects model with a lagged dependent 
variable; results are reported in Appendix Table A1.18 Inspection of Table A1 reveals that the 
fixed effects estimator with lagged dependent variable yields an estimate of      0.0342 for 
the full sample. Interestingly, this is only slightly above the upper boundary of the ‘true’ 
interval as defined by the Angrist-Pischke result. In sum, all three models yield results that 
are broadly in accordance, and we can with some confidence conclude that the ‘true’ 
                                                      
18 The estimating equation in this case is                ·      ·      ∑     ·    ·   
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estimate of    is about 0.03. To economise on space, we only report results using equation (1) 
from now on. Estimation of equation (2) yields similar results and conclusions.  
If instead of adjusted growth rates we use unadjusted growth rates (calculated using real GDP 
per capita in local currency units), we get point estimates that are somewhat higher and less 
precisely estimated, cf. Table 4. Reduced signal-to-noise ratios, and thus less precisely 
estimated parameters, are exactly what we would expect with unadjusted growth rates. In 
the full sample associated with column 1 of Table 4, for example, we get a    value of 0.0525 
that is significant at 10%.  
Table 4. Fixed effects estimation 
Estimating equation:                ·      ·      ∑     ·    ·   
 
                   
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Unadjusted  growth 
                          
Constant 0.0151***  0.0148***  0.0150***  0.0149***  0.0154***  0.0150*** 0.0145*** 0.0164*** 
(0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
2.year#totnatresrent 0.0525*  0.0545*  0.0281  0.0497*  0.0613** 0.0525** 0.0528** 0.0880** 
(0.0266) (0.0285) (0.0300) (0.0282) (0.0289) (0.0266) (0.0266) (0.0386) 
2.year#EAS 0.0036 0.0053  0.0038 0.0030 0.0036 0.0036 0.0011 
(0.0055)  (0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0058) 
2.year#ECS 0.0276***  0.0275***  0.0278***  0.0272***  0.0276*** 0.0276*** 0.0258*** 
(0.0071) (0.0071)  (0.0072) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0071) (0.0068) 
2.year#LCN 0.0137***  0.0136***  0.0149***  0.0133***  0.0137*** 0.0137*** 0.0119** 
(0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0045)  (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0046) 
2.year#MEA -0.0018  -0.0021  0.0028  -0.0012 -0.0018  -0.0018  -0.0084 
(0.0089) (0.0092) (0.0090) (0.0091)  (0.0089) (0.0089) (0.0113) 
2.year#NAC -0.0141*** -0.0141***  -0.0141*** -0.0141*** -0.0141***  -0.0141*** -0.0141*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) 
2.year#SAS 0.0128***  0.0127***  0.0140***  0.0129***  0.0123***  0.0128*** 0.0109** 
(0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0042) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0043)  (0.0049) 
2.year#SSF 0.0038  0.0036  0.0071 0.0042 0.0027 0.0038 0.0038 
(0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0064) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0066) (0.0066) 
Observations  324 280 244 260 292 322 312 234 
R-squared  0.237 0.244 0.135 0.222 0.253 0.236 0.234 0.339 
Number  of  countries  162 140 122 130 146 161 156 117 
Excluded region  None  EAS  ECS  LCN  MEA  NAC  SAS  SSF 
Notes: Asterisks *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. All standard errors (in 
parenthesis) are clustered at the country level. Regional code is: East Asia & Pacific (EAS), Europe and Central 
Asia (ECS), Latin America & Caribbean (LCN), Middle East & North Africa (MEA), North America (NAC), South 
Asia (SAS), sub-Saharan Africa (SSF).  
In the Appendix, we shrink the sample window from 1992-2008 to 1993-2007 to see whether 
our results are in any way dependent on our choice of sample window. Table A2 (which 
should be compared to Table 2) reports results with adjusted growth for the sample period 
1993-2007. As is evident upon inspecting the table, this change of sample period is not 
wholly innocuous. While precision is roughly unchanged, point estimates are reduced and, 
as a consequence, t-values drop. However, point estimates remain marginally significant. HOW MUCH DID CHINA’S WTO ACCESSION INCREASE ECONOMIC GROWTH IN RESOURCE-RICH COUNTRIES? | 11 
 
The optimistic note from this exercise is therefore that a ‘true’ estimate of     0 . 0 3  appears 
quite robust.  
In the Appendix, we also construct a resource dummy, which is equal to 1 if the country has 
positive resource rent. In our sample of 162 countries, 17 countries have no resource rent at 
all. With the resource dummy, results are always significant at 5%, cf. Table A3.  
6.   Counterfactual scenarios 
In this section we compare actual with counterfactual growth, the latter being the growth rate 
in resource-rich countries during 2002-08 had there been no China-induced increase in 
demand for natural resources. That is, our counterfactual scenario is a world in which China 
did not join the WTO. Consequently, we define      as the difference between actual and 
counterfactual average annual real GDP per capita growth during the period 2002-08. 
Formally, we have 
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        ·
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CC measures by how much China’s WTO accession increased growth in resource-rich 
countries relative to what growth would have been in these selfsame countries had China not 
entered the WTO.  
Table 5 reports the computations for the seven regions as well as the full sample. For the full 
sample, and using     0 . 0 3 , the increased demand for various raw materials induced by 
China’s WTO accession increased average annual growth by about 0.27 percentage points 
relative to counterfactual growth. Since actual growth during 2002-08 in the full sample was 
3.13%, we have that in proportional terms China’s increased demand for commodities 
explains only about (0.27/3.13) = 8.62%. Put differently, in the full sample less than one tenth 
of actual average annual growth between 2002-08 was, according to our calculations, due to 
the increase in demand for commodities that resulted from China’s WTO accession. 
Table 5. Counterfactual scenarios by region 
Region #  Observations 
1
 
·        
 
   
   
   
  
  
   
       0.03 ·  
 
 
  
   
EAS 22  0.0258  0.07  0.21%-point 
ECS 40  0.0169  0.05  0.15%-point 
LCN 32  0.0323  0.05  0.15%-point 
MEA 16  0.0276  0.19  0.57%-point 
NAC1 1  0.0260  0  0%-point 
SAS 6  0.0376  0.05  0.15%-point 
SSF 45  0.0270  0.13  0.29%-point 
Full sample  162  0.0313  0.09  0.27%-point 
Notes: Regional code is East Asia & Pacific (EAS), Europe and Central Asia (ECS), Latin America & Caribbean 
(LCN), Middle East & North Africa (MEA), North America (NAC), South Asia (SAS), sub-Saharan Africa (SSF). 
1) The only NAC country in our sample is Bermuda, which has no natural resources. Canada and the United 
States are dropped from the sample due to missing earthlight data. 
It is of independent interest to restrict attention to the different regions, with none perhaps 
more interesting than sub-Saharan Africa. The African continent is rich in natural resources 
and has experienced rapid economic growth since China entered the WTO. Africa has about 12 | ANDERSEN, BARSLUND, HANSEN, HARR & JENSEN 
 
half the world’s gold reserves and a third of its diamonds, not to mention copper, coltan and 
all sorts of other minerals and metals. Doing the calculation for sub-Saharan Africa with 
    0 . 0 3 , we find that the increased demand for industrial commodities that resulted from 
China’s WTO accession increased economic growth by 0.29 percentage points in absolute 
terms and 10.74% in proportional terms. Our results thus indicate that less than 11% of 
Africa’s spectacular growth between 2002 and 2008 was due to China’s increasing appetite 
for industrial commodities.  
As noted in Section 1, China is in the process of shifting its developmental model from one 
driven by exports and investment to a more balanced model driven in large part by domestic 
consumption. So there is no doubt that we will see significantly slower Chinese growth in 
the years to come.19 For example, in its July 2013 update to the World Economic Outlook, the 
IMF cut the growth forecast for China to 7.8%, down from its 8.1% outlook in April; the 
forecast for 2014 was cut from 8.3% to 7.7%.20 Slower Chinese growth will affect economies 
around the world. Analysts predict that it will particularly hurt exporters of raw materials 
such as Africa, Australia, and Latin America.21 While this is undoubtedly true, there is little 
or no quantitative evidence on exactly how badly they will be hurt.  
The counterfactual scenarios reported in Table 5 may shed some light on the likely economic 
impact of a Chinese growth slowdown. Indeed, an obvious way to interpret the 
counterfactuals is as a rough indication of what will happen if the Chinese economy reverts 
to its pre-accession growth trajectory. According to this interpretation, a Chinese growth 
reduction should not seriously undermine the growth rate of resource-rich countries.  
7.   Concluding remarks 
In this paper, we have suggested an empirical strategy that delivers an estimate of the 
impact of China’s WTO accession on economic growth in resource-rich countries. According 
to our results, the Chinese WTO entry explains less than one tenth of the growth experienced 
by resource-rich countries since 2002. This appears to be less than conventional wisdom. The 
Economist, for example, ‘guestimates’ that around one third of Africa’s growth can be 
explained by the boom in commodities.22  
To the extent that the past is a useful guide to the future, we would not – based on our 
results – expect to see growth in resource-rich countries slow by much more than what is 
reported in Table 5. This is of course a medium-run prediction because excess capacity, built 
on a flawed assumption of continued double-digit Chinese growth, may lead to some short-
run overshooting. Nevertheless, our results do not suggest that a Chinese rebalancing will 
derail economic growth in resource-abundant countries. 
                                                      
19 The World Bank estimates that Chinese growth will slow to between 6% and 7% by the end of the 
decade; see Financial Times, 15 April 2011, “China enters era of slower growth.” The Economist is also 
confident that China’s growth momentum is slowing; see The Economist, 17 August 2013, “A bubble in 
pessimism”. 
20 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/update/02/pdf/0713.pdf  
21 See Financial Times, 15 April 2010, “China enters era of slower growth.” See also Financial Times, 22 
July 2013, “China: slower but steady”. 
22 The Economist, 3 December 2011, “The sun shines bright”. HOW MUCH DID CHINA’S WTO ACCESSION INCREASE ECONOMIC GROWTH IN RESOURCE-RICH COUNTRIES? | 13 
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Appendix: Tables 
Table A1. Fixed effects estimation 
Estimating equation:                ·      ·      ∑     ·    ·   
 
         ·                      
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES  Adjusted growth 
                          
Constant 0.0115**  0.0168*** 0.0131*** 0.0100*  0.0096* 0.0114**  0.0110**  0.0084** 
(0.0045) (0.0053) (0.0048) (0.0056) (0.0050) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0042) 
2.year#totnatresrent 0.0342*** 0.0378*** 0.0254*** 0.0330*** 0.0393*** 0.0342*** 0.0341*** 0.0332* 
(0.0087) (0.0083) (0.0095) (0.0092) (0.0091) (0.0087) (0.0087) (0.0180) 
2.year#EAS 0.0133***  0.0127*** 0.0135*** 0.0131*** 0.0133*** 0.0134*** 0.0142*** 
(0.0035)  (0.0034) (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0035) (0.0036) (0.0039) 
2.year#ECS 0.0317***  0.0320***  0.0318*** 0.0315*** 0.0317*** 0.0318*** 0.0326*** 
(0.0031) (0.0030)  (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0033) 
2.year#LCN 0.0200***  0.0202*** 0.0194***  0.0198*** 0.0200*** 0.0201*** 0.0207*** 
(0.0018) (0.0019) (0.0018)  (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0022) 
2.year#MEA 0.0143***  0.0139*** 0.0150*** 0.0145***  0.0143*** 0.0143*** 0.0150*** 
(0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0042) (0.0043)  (0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0056) 
2.year#NAC 0.0196***  0.0203*** 0.0175*** 0.0197*** 0.0197*** 0.0197***  0.0210*** 
(0.0015) (0.0016) (0.0013) (0.0016) (0.0015)  (0.0015) (0.0027) 
2.year#SAS 0.0252***  0.0258*** 0.0236*** 0.0254*** 0.0251*** 0.0252***  0.0267*** 
(0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0034) (0.0037) (0.0036) (0.0036)  (0.0045) 
2.year#SSF 0.0143***  0.0141*** 0.0146*** 0.0145*** 0.0136*** 0.0143*** 0.0143*** 
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0030) 
y -0.0474***  -0.0500***  -0.0403***  -0.0478***  -0.0479***  -0.0474*** -0.0477*** -0.0521*** 
 (0.0051)  (0.0055)  (0.0045)  (0.0055)  (0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0091) 
Observations  324 280 244 260 292 322 312 234 
R-squared 0.655  0.688  0.581  0.645 0.669 0.655 0.655 0.677 
Number  of  countries  162 140 122 130 146 161 156 117 
Excluded region  None  EAS  ECS  LCN  MEA  NAC  SAS  SSF 
Notes: Asterisks *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. All standard errors (in 
parenthesis) are clustered at the country level. Regional code is: East Asia & Pacific (EAS), Europe and Central 
Asia (ECS), Latin America & Caribbean (LCN), Middle East & North Africa (MEA), North America (NAC), South 
Asia (SAS), sub-Saharan Africa (SSF).   HOW MUCH DID CHINA’S WTO ACCESSION INCREASE ECONOMIC GROWTH IN RESOURCE-RICH COUNTRIES? | 15 
 
Table A2. Fixed effects estimation with sample period 1993-2007 
Estimating equation:                ·      ·      ∑     ·    ·   
 
                   
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES  Adjusted growth 
                          
Constant 0.0188***  0.0187***  0.0187*** 0.0187*** 0.0190*** 0.0188*** 0.0184*** 0.0192*** 
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) 
2.year#totnatresrent 0.0244*  0.0254*  0.0103  0.0224  0.0276* 0.0244* 0.0246* 0.0501** 
(0.0134) (0.0144) (0.0137) (0.0141) (0.0148) (0.0134) (0.0134) (0.0202) 
2.year#EAS 0.0100***  0.0110*** 0.0101*** 0.0098*** 0.0100*** 0.0100*** 0.0082** 
(0.0030)  (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0031) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0032) 
2.year#ECS 0.0203***  0.0202***  0.0204*** 0.0201*** 0.0203*** 0.0203*** 0.0189*** 
(0.0038) (0.0038)  (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0036) 
2.year#LCN 0.0132***  0.0132*** 0.0139***  0.0131*** 0.0132*** 0.0132*** 0.0119*** 
(0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022)  (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0022) (0.0023) 
2.year#MEA 0.0066  0.0065  0.0093**  0.0070  0.0066 0.0066 0.0018 
(0.0046) (0.0048) (0.0046) (0.0047)  (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0059) 
2.year#NAC 0.0040***  0.0040*** 0.0040*** 0.0040*** 0.0040*** 0.0040***  0.0040*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) 
2.year#SAS 0.0120***  0.0119*** 0.0127*** 0.0121*** 0.0118*** 0.0120***  0.0107** 
(0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0040) (0.0041) (0.0041) (0.0040)  (0.0043) 
2.year#SSF 0.0076*  0.0075*  0.0095**  0.0079* 0.0072* 0.0076* 0.0076* 
(0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0038) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040) 
Observations  328 280 248 264 296 326 316 238 
R-squared  0.363 0.358 0.293 0.332 0.365 0.363 0.359 0.506 
Number  of  countries  164 140 124 132 148 163 158 119 
Excluded region  None  EAS  ECS  LCN  MEA  NAC  SAS  SSF 
Notes: Asterisks *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. All standard errors (in 
parenthesis) are clustered at the country level. Regional code is: East Asia & Pacific (EAS), Europe and Central 
Asia (ECS), Latin America & Caribbean (LCN), Middle East & North Africa (MEA), North America (NAC), South 
Asia (SAS), sub-Saharan Africa (SSF).  
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Table A3. Fixed effects estimation with resource dummy 
Estimating equation:                ·      ·      ∑     ·    ·   
 
                   
    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES  Adjusted growth 
                          
Constant 0.0155***  0.0151***  0.0162***  0.0150***  0.0158***  0.0155*** 0.0151*** 0.0161*** 
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) 
2.year#1[totnatresrent>0]  0.0115*** 0.0095**  0.0079** 0.0171***  0.0115***  0.0115*** 0.0115*** 0.0121*** 
(0.0038) (0.0044) (0.0039) (0.0045) (0.0040) (0.0038) (0.0038) (0.0040) 
2.year#EAS -0.0012  0.0015  -0.0056  -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0012 -0.0017 
(0.0042)  (0.0044) (0.0046) (0.0044) (0.0042) (0.0042) (0.0043) 
2.year#ECS 0.0148***  0.0167***  0.0096* 0.0149***  0.0148*** 0.0148*** 0.0142*** 
(0.0050) (0.0053)  (0.0050) (0.0051) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0051) 
2.year#LCN 0.0053  0.0069  0.0082**  0.0053 0.0053 0.0053 0.0047 
(0.0039) (0.0043) (0.0039)  (0.0041) (0.0039) (0.0039) (0.0041) 
2.year#MEA 0.0040  0.0059  0.0073 -0.0013  0.0040 0.0040 0.0034 
(0.0048) (0.0052) (0.0049) (0.0053)  (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0050) 
2.year#NAC 0.0057***  0.0057***  0.0057***  0.0057***  0.0057***  0.0057*** 0.0057*** 
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)  (0.0000) (0.0000) 
2.year#SAS 0.0013  0.0033  0.0049 -0.0043  0.0013 0.0013  0.0006 
(0.0048) (0.0053) (0.0049) (0.0054) (0.0050) (0.0048)  (0.0050) 
2.year#SSF 0.0018  0.0037  0.0053 -0.0037  0.0018 0.0018 0.0018 
Constant (0.0051)  (0.0055)  (0.0051)  (0.0056) (0.0053) (0.0051) (0.0051) 
Observations  324 280 244 260 292 322 312 234 
R-squared 0.416  0.420  0.342  0.405 0.409 0.416 0.412 0.503 
Number  of  countries  162 140 122 130 146 161 156 117 
Excluded  region  None EAS  ECS  LCN MEA NAC SAS  SSF 
Notes: Asterisks *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. All standard errors (in 
parenthesis) are clustered at the country level. Regional code is: East Asia & Pacific (EAS), Europe and Central 
Asia (ECS), Latin America & Caribbean (LCN), Middle East & North Africa (MEA), North America (NAC), South 
Asia (SAS), sub-Saharan Africa (SSF).  